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Political Violence:  
A Typology
V i n c e n z o  R u g g i e R o
Abstract. This paper offers a typology of different forms of political violence, linking 
them in a continuum and in an interdependent field of forces. The forms identified 
are systemic violence, institutional violence, group violence, armed struggle, terrorism 
and war. in the final section, after discussing how these types of violence influence one 
another, a strategy is suggested for their simultaneous reduction. 
inTRoducTion
Violence is at the center of theoretical elaborations around the creation of 
identities, the establishment of the law and the shaping of authority. Subjects 
are formed through violence, and the norms through which this formation 
is carried out “are by definition violent”: we are given genders, positions and 
status against our will (Butler 2009, 167). Analyses of the state also focus on 
violence, describing it as a lawmaking force that establishes new systems and 
designates new authorities. direct organized force, in sum, is deemed central 
to the process of state-making (Tilly 1985). This type of violence, however, 
can also amount to law-conserving violence, when it protects the stability of 
systems and reinforces authority (derrida 1992; Benjamin 1996). 
The analysis of violence, from this perspective, can explain how power is 
formed and distributed within society and how such distribution can be al-
tered. This is also the aim of this contribution, which, after proposing a typol-
ogy of political violence, attempts to suggest strategies for the reduction of the 
intensity of each type identified. 
doi: https://doi.org/10.15388/crimLithuan.2017.5.11732
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SySTEMIc VIoLEncE
Social, economic and political arrangements contain elements of systemic 
violence, as they reproduce inequality, immobility, injustice and misery. Such 
arrangements are presented as ineluctable outcomes of human interactions 
and historical processes, and are supported by justificatory ideologies. 
In the economic sphere, doctrines claiming scientific validity or divine na-
ture were and are responsible for colossal amounts of violence. For example, 
Locke’s idea of private property as a divine gift led colonialists to subjugate 
and destroy populations that were unaware of this gift. The victims of systemic 
violence, in this case, by ignoring the divine nature of private ownership, lo-
cated themselves outside the human community (Stannard 1992). Mercantilist 
ideas justified the erasure of traditional economies, making the starvation ac-
ceptable in the name of progress. Physiocrats, through the notion that wealth 
derives exclusively from the exploitation of the land, caused the victimization 
of independent farmers, who were deprived of their mean of subsistence as a 
result of the privatization and concentration of rural property. Malthus theo-
rized the culling of redundant populations, those who had not been invited to 
the banquet of life. His “scientific” doctrine was derided by Jonathan Swift’s 
proposal to solve the problem of malnutrition through the use of children as 
foodstuff. Adam Smith’s suggestion, one that unemployment caused by eco-
nomic development is “in the long run” destined to be neutralized by new 
ascending productive sectors, neglected the lethal injuries caused by inactivity. 
A couple of centuries later, Keynes argued that the unemployed could not wait 
for the eventual emergence of new economic initiatives and that “in the long 
run” we will all be dead. David Ricardo’s emphasis on risk and innovation in 
response to economic decline echoes Merton’s deviant adaptations, particu-
larly those of the “innovative” type, which pursue official goals through illegiti-
mate means. Marshall’s theory of marginal utility, in which acceptable wages 
are said to correspond to the money that the last available worker is prepared 
to receive, borders with a justification of slavery. We could go on, focusing, for 
instance, on what is commonly described as neoliberalism and the social and 
environmental damage its theories encourage (Ruggiero 2013). However, one 
should resist the temptation to impute particular callousness to current domi-
nant economic doctrines: the systemic violence produced by the market itself, 
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whatever the philosophy inspiring it, places economic initiative beyond the 
reach of democratic contestation, let alone ethical assessment (Mitchell 2013). 
Many years ago, Durkheim (1974) rightly argued that the stock exchange may 
be more murderous than any ruthless serial killer.
Systemic violence, in sum, is found in the smooth functioning of econom-
ic and political systems, and can be termed “objective,” as it appears not to 
require specific deliberations by individuals exerting it. on the other hand, 
“subjective” violence is likely to be perceived as such when it appears to be an 
anomalous, visible, a deviation from a social context characterized by non-
violence (zizek 2008). objective violence, however, is, in its turn, visible in 
the outcomes listed above relating to different waves of economic reasoning. 
Even Marx, to be sure, supported the violence implicit in the destruction of 
primitive economies (i.e., India) in the name of progress and the creation of an 
industrial, revolutionary working class. 
The violence produced in the economic sphere, in turn, is accompanied by 
that arising from the political apparatus, which may also cause harm through 
strategies of omission. Political systems, in this way, while officially display-
ing confidence in, or even boasting, their morality, contribute to the denial of 
life and injustice (Honderich 1989, xix). Advanced political systems, for in-
stance, may be unlikely to send poisoned food parcels to starving populations; 
nevertheless, they do little to relieve their starvation. They pollute developing 
countries with their waste and, although they do not intentionally infect them 
with serious diseases, they omit to guarantee minimum medical care for them. 
At the domestic level, they do not remove books from poor schools, but cut 
the budget for primary education. They do not force people to become home-
less, but omit to stop private profits being made out of people needy of ac-
commodation. Such systems omit to remedy a situation they themselves have 
created, in which the economically worst-off tenth of their own population 
have a considerably shorter life expectancy than the average. They may or may 
not contribute funds to dictatorships, but certainly do not contribute funds to 
movements fighting dictators.
omissions entail choice, but political choice is denied or blocked because 
it would be inconsistent with the injunctions of the economic sphere, which, 
as a “perfect science,” only requires obedience. At the same time, for political 
power, decisions are important, but just as important are the decisions that are 
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not made, the proposals that are never considered, the innovative ideas that 
are somehow always out of the question. “Ruling a country means controlling 
the political agenda, defining what is thinkable and unthinkable, and this work 
is always done behind the façade of democratic politics” (Walzer 2004, 24). 
This is a form of symbolic violence embodied in language, which reproduces 
relations of domination while imposing a certain universe of meaning (zizek 
2008). Systemic violence, in brief, is the result of the policies dictated by, and 
intertwined with, the dogmas of economic thought. Let us now look at the law, 
another source of systemic violence.
When linking the law with the economic and the political spheres, the for-
mer ends up coinciding with a form of administration, a technique of gov-
ernment transcending generally shared values. As a consequence, principles 
mutate following the contingent objectives that individuals and groups set for 
themselves, thus triggering a conflict between advocates of strict legality and 
legal pragmatists. 
Advocates of strict legality may be described as formalists, in that they de-
rive rules of conduct from the logic of written texts, without attributing any 
role to the values, the ideological leanings or the very culture of those who 
administer law. “The law as seen from a formalist perspective is a compen-
dium of texts, like the Bible, and the task of the judge or other legal analysts 
is to discern and apply the internal logic of the compendium” (Posner 2013, 
3). The legal apparatus limits its task to interpreting and is indifferent to the 
consequences of its interpretations. on the contrary, the pragmatist is sensi-
tive to the outcomes of judicial rulings, and considers systemic as well as case-
specific consequences. now, whether we believe that the law is nothing but 
a set of techniques for the perpetuation of power or that its universal values 
satisfy the needs of all, the dominant system finds a degree of legitimation in 
both beliefs. The former belief confirms that the dominant system is legitimate 
because supported by the law, while the latter helps systems to claim their right 
to ignore the law or change it pragmatically. Judges who are “cognitive misers” 
and regard innovation as costly will adhere to established texts, which are fa-
vorable to power. They will act as lexicographers, finding answers in books and 
codes. “cognitive adventurous” judges, on the other hand, will “treat law as a 
branch of rhetoric, or literature – or (without acknowledgement, of course) 
politics” (ibid., 82). They will therefore alter previous interpretations and rul-
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ings. The existing system of power, in brief, will win in both cases. conserva-
tives will manifest their judicial passivity by taking inspiration from original 
texts, while imaginative innovators will rewrite norms: both will condone the 
harm produced by power. Plato and Thrasymachus, finally, find an unexpected 
synthesis in the perpetuation of systemic violence (Ruggiero 2015). 
Drawing freely on the interpretation of René Girard (1988), we might ar-
gue that systemic violence possesses some traits in common with sacrificial vi-
olence, whereby societies seek to deflect upon vulnerable victims the violence 
that would otherwise be vented on the members it most desires to protect. This 
mechanism appears clearly, albeit in a different guise, when the second type of 
political violence is examined.
InSTITUTIonAL VIoLEncE
By studying the crimes of the powerful, the conclusion can be drawn that 
economic and political institutions are major sources of harm, injury and vio-
lence. These transcend the systemic damage caused by the routine running 
of states and markets, being the outcome of violations perpetrated by indi-
viduals and groups against their own official principles and philosophies. State 
agents violating their own written norms engage in abuse, torture and killing. 
organizations that violate their officially stated principles include enterprises 
standing up for market freedom while, in practice, showing little credence in 
such freedom. Price-fixing and other forms of unfair competition are cases in 
point, which are commonly enacted through corruption or intimidation but 
may also be supported by violence. Firms causing death and lethal diseases, 
in their turn, violate health and safety regulations or infringe norms for the 
protection of the environment. 
Institutional violence may trigger a lawmaking mechanism: torture, mili-
tary invasion, kidnapping of suspects and the use of prohibited weapons cre-
ate important precedents and, when undetected, tolerated and unprosecuted, 
rewrite the international law and refound the principles of justice. This vio-
lence is, therefore, foundational, as it is capable of transforming the previous 
jurisprudence and establishing new laws and new types of legitimacy. Insti-
tutional violence is the result of the “blunted moral sensitivity” (Wright Mills 
1956) adopted in response to contrived crisis and emergencies. For instance, 
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violence can be triggered by imagined threats, followed by a shifting of the bal-
ance between security and human and civil rights, leading to violations by the 
authorities of their own laws. 
The analysis of institutional violence can rely on economic variables, for 
example, in explaining the illegality of firms and corporations as an attempt to 
neutralize or temper the decline they experience (or simply fear) in their prof-
its. Violence, in the economic sphere, can be a means available to foxes as well 
as to lions, two categories of entrepreneurs described by Pareto (1935; 1966) 
respectively, as the short-term opportunists who combine diverse interests and 
adopt cunning strategies and those who are bound in persistent aggregations 
and pursue long-term goals (Harrington 2005). Violence can also be analyzed 
against the background of the anomie theory, whereby it is one of the numer-
ous instruments available to the elite who operate in already normless contexts 
and are, therefore, encouraged to experiment with conducts and arbitrarily 
expand on practices. 
conflict theory would postulate that all violent manifestations in social 
systems are to be interpreted as the outcome of the polarization of power and 
resources, and that successful imputations of violent conduct are normally 
the prerogative of powerful groups who so label the conduct adopted by the 
powerless. Institutional violence, on the other hand, is the object of analysis 
focusing on micro-sociological aspects, more particularly on the observation 
of the dynamics that guide the behavior of organizations and their members. 
As organizations become more complex, it is maintained, responsibilities are 
decentralized, while their human components find themselves inhabiting an 
increasingly opaque environment in which the goals to pursue and the mo-
dalities through which one is expected to pursue them become vague and ne-
gotiable. Violence perpetrated by organizations can be regarded as an outcome 
of such opacity and vagueness. 
Institutional agents may be led to violence by their inherent nature as homo 
duplex, with which Durkheim (1951) refers to the copresence of violence and 
sociability in social actors. or simply because they inhabit such contexts as 
markets, seen by Weber as substantially irrational and inspirers of speculation, 
gambling and bullying. Merton’s notion of “winning” rather than “wining ac-
cording to the rules” provides yet a supplementary viewpoint, while another 
crucial aspect of institutional violence may finally derive from the appreciation 
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of the variable “uncertainty.” Powerful agents, in the political as well as in the 
economic arena, are not only led to violations and violence by the “objective” 
dynamics of the free enterprise system or the concrete political situation. Their 
perception plays a central role, as does their subjective assessment of the posi-
tion they occupy in the market and in the political system. Their acts are often 
inspired by the forecast of future economic and political developments. Insti-
tutional violence, like other forms of crimes of the powerful, therefore, could 
be partly deemed as the outcome of fear for the future. As Poggi (2001, 11) has 
perceptively argued:
Power has to do with the future, with expectations, with hopes and fears. In 
this sense, it has anthropological significance… Hobbes was right in saying that 
humans alone, among animals, can feel tomorrow’s hunger today. We can think of 
power as a way of confronting and controlling the inexorable sense of contingency 
and insecurity generated by our awareness of the future. 
Institutional violence, ultimately, is the result of an obsessive relationship 
of powerful individuals and groups with their future; it is a form of accumula-
tion and accretion of the power such groups already possess, inspired by fear 
that in the future, events may lead to them losing it. Returning to René Girard’s 
suggestion that sacrificial violence seeks to deflect upon vulnerable victims 
the violence that would otherwise be vented on the elitist members of socie-
ties, we should add that institutional violence also expresses the fear that anti-
institutional violence may be soon gathering force. It is to anti-institutional 
violence that I now turn.
cRoWDS AnD GRoUP VIoLEncE
Defiant groups who respond to systemic and institutional violence have 
been depicted as inclined to destroy “those religious, political, and social be-
liefs in which all elements of our civilization are rooted” (Le Bon 2008, 34). The 
entry of the popular classes into political life marked the era of crowds, regard-
ed as incapable of reasoning, quick to act, and adept at forging an “organized 
mental unity.” The crowd was seen as a psychological entity, which makes its 
human components unify feelings and develop a collective mind: “crowds feel, 
think, and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual 
of them would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation” (ibid., 36). 
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Individuals forming a crowd do not confine themselves to putting their quali-
ties or characteristics in common, but confer new ones to the crowd they form. 
First, they acquire a sentiment of invincible power, which unleashes instincts 
commonly kept under restraint. Second, they are subject to contagion, a hyp-
notic phenomenon leading to irresponsible action. Third, they lose conscious 
personality and discernment. As automatons who cease to be guided by their 
will, they acquire “the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity, but also the en-
thusiasm and heroism of primitive beings’”(ibid., 39). 
Similar notions of the crowd were adopted in descriptions of organized 
group violence throughout the nineteenth century, when, for instance, posi-
tivist criminologists saw the participants in the commune of Paris (1871) as 
“atavistic criminals,” led to irrational violence by collective hypnosis. conced-
ing that agency played a part in rebellions, Lombroso (1894), however, de-
tected in the insurgents several traits characterizing “complete criminal types 
and mad types,” arguing that most were ex-convicts, robbers, pimps or pros-
titutes. Meanwhile, Marx stressed that the communards were not criminal 
enough, because they showed a sacred respect for the Bank of France, and 
Louise Michel (1898, 11), a leading participant in the commune, wrote about 
the “terrible days when freedom touched us with its wing.” She recalled the 
greatness of the revolutionaries, but also the excessive hesitation resulting 
from their profound honesty.
Successive analyses of crowds have focused on their role in history and 
on the material needs that cause uprisings, be these grain shortages or rapid 
processes of industrialization (Rudé 1964). In the attempt to seek rational 
explanations, riots have been described not as “mindless, indiscriminate, or 
copycat incidents,” but as “purposive actions of impoverished labourers or mi-
nority groups seeking to better their lot” (Jones 2000, 70). During the 1960s 
and 1970s, criminological analysis, too, tried to explain the logic of riots. With 
the premise that every crime incorporates a political element, Quinney (1971) 
contended that group violence can bring social change when other channels 
of the democratic process are inappropriate or insensitive to the grievances 
of sections of the population. Harsh laws regulating demonstrations, police 
intimidation and brutality were deemed responsible for turning protesters 
into rioters. It should be noted that, in this way, political violence was mainly 
equated to institutional violence, thus excluding that rational agents might 
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choose violence as an expression of political dissent. Anti-racist demonstra-
tions were said to actually turn into “police riots,” as officers engaged in violent 
acts in the name of crowd control. “Increased use of police power has been 
justified as necessary to combat violence. But the paradox is that the violence 
that the police attempt to control is inspired in many instances by the police 
themselves” (Quinney 1970, 315). 
From the perspective of critical criminology, riots and organized group 
violence only possess a “pre-political” nature, and both are a reaction to the 
position certain individuals and groups occupy in an unjust social structure. 
There is, at times, a sense of pity and empathy for what is deemed pre-political 
violence as expressed in riots, which are normally attributed to frustration at 
the indifference or hostility of the media or the continuing harassment by the 
police. Looting, which takes place during riots, in its turn, is interpreted as 
a result of a consumerist culture generating possessive individualism (Taylor 
1981). 
Riots, on the other hand, can be included among those hostile outbursts 
discussed by Smelser (1963), who frames collective violence in a general set 
of concepts, including conduciveness and strain. conduciveness is not only 
associated with inequality, injustice and, in general, social strain, but also with 
the presence of channels for the expression of grievances and the possibility 
for communication among the aggrieved (think of the use of social media 
in recent riots). These channels of expression and communication are better 
functioning when riots are linked with large-scale social movements. “The 
prime differences among terms such as a riot, revolt, rebellion, insurrection 
and revolution – all of which involve hostile outburst – stem from the scope of 
their associated social movement” (ibid., 227).
Strain may stem from established cleavages, which amount to social dif-
ferentiation and which inevitably produce identity and, at times, resentment. 
Religious, ethnic, national, tribal and regional divisions are examples of such 
cleavages, which include divisions based on an unequal allocation of wealth 
and power. Besides these established cleavages, hostility can emerge from new 
cleavages created by a growing sensitivity toward previously neglected issues 
(think of the environment). Because global channels of communication are 
increasingly available for the expression of old and new grievances, it could be 
argued that repression in the form of preventing some groups from accessing 
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them would intensify rather than defuse hostility. Established cleavages can be 
termed “institutionalized strains” and may give rise to chronic conflict, as, for 
example, the conflicts caused by ethnic, political, class, and religious divisions. 
In these areas, riots may become an endemic feature of social life.
Recent riots in London and Paris could be framed as the result of a process 
that, at the first stage, entails a form of “brutalization,” namely the experience 
of individuals as witnesses of violent acts suffered by others with whom they 
identify. The second stage of the process is termed “defiance” and is character-
ized by the resolve of actors to put an end to the violence they have witnessed. 
With the third stage, “dominance engagement,” individuals and groups exert 
their violent responses as a way of deterring the violence by which they have 
been victimized (Athens 1997, 1992; o’Donnel 2003). In general, the violence 
deployed in riots is “non-teleological” in nature, in that it is not precisely 
linked to specific demands but constitutes a request for recognition based on 
resentment (zizek 2008). There was no political program behind the burning 
of the banlieues of Paris or the inner cities of London. 
ARMED STRUGGLE
Armed struggle, on the contrary, possesses exactly that: a guiding frame-
work that prefigures specific objectives and inscribes action into a sociopo-
litical trajectory. The program followed by armed struggle is part of a cog-
nitive map of sort that locates actors and their experience of conflict within 
a meaningful whole. Those engaged express values based on shared beliefs, 
which may prefigure a completely new social system and, while doing so, es-
tablish definite battle lines. The spread of beliefs is crucial for the development 
of armed struggle, while communication preparing people for action is nor-
mally expressed through an informal exchange of views or through organized 
propaganda and agitation. Again, what is important here is not so much the 
power of the images and beliefs exchanged as the effectiveness of the estab-
lished communication machinery utilized. For this reason, those engaged in 
armed struggle are under the constant pressure to calibrate their objectives 
with those mobilizing social movements, so that these can provide sympathy, 
support or even recruits.
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Armed struggle does not need to be led by highly motivated and “supreme” 
leaders, but may be conducted by fractions of well-organized social move-
ments who take the leadership of already aggrieved and hostile social groups. 
The outbursts of these groups, in such cases, are not instigated by social move-
ments or their leaders, but are part and parcel of their routine hostility toward 
the system. Armed struggle is, therefore, an attempt to give hostile groups and 
their outbursts an organizational structure and a rationale, a calculable trend, 
so that uncoordinated hostility is slowly turned into military action (highly 
specialized and integrated) toward a predictable end. 
Preexisting structures within social movements are, of course, paramount, 
though new forms of coordinated violence may emerge because of the poor 
results achieved by such structures. Social movements, however, at times pro-
vide armed struggle with infrastructures, an inherited repertoire of action and 
beliefs and a memory.
Social movements, in their turn, along with the aggrieved groups they rep-
resent, interact with law enforcers, and the nature of such interaction is likely to 
determine the position taken by actors in respect of the battle line. Some individ-
uals and groups will adopt peaceful forms of protest as an integral part of their 
rights, while others will come to the conclusion that protest is quintessentially 
violent. Radicalization of protest, then, may produce harsher state repression 
and unleash a vicious circle of violence-repression-violence-repression (Della 
Porta 1995). Minority protest groups begin to perceive, at this stage, that the 
use of violent means becomes necessary, as these constitute a mere extension of 
the social conflicts in which larger groups also engage. Some may opt for armed 
struggle, which, in their view, is nothing else than the extension of already exist-
ing social conflict. At this stage, targets are immediately recognizable symbols, as 
they are related to specific arenas in which protesters engage.
An escalating process may then lead to a different stage. While concrete 
achievements are relentlessly dismantled and the political space narrowed, 
violent protest groups may take a relatively independent trajectory. Their ac-
tion, for instance, can be channeled into the pursuit of a limited range of ob-
jectives, the achievement of which, under normal circumstances, would not 
require the use of high degrees of violence. In other words, perfectly legitimate 
goals slowly come to be pursued through illegitimate means. Armed struggle, 
thus, turns into armed trade unionism, while the growth of the armed group, 
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the recruitment among activists and the accumulation of firepower start los-
ing connections with the social issues originally addressed. In a subsequent 
phase, anti-institutional political violence may evolve into armed propaganda, 
as groups become completely disconnected from the social objectives alleg-
edly inspiring them and devote most of their energies to the accumulation of 
military strength. Violent acts, at this stage, simply allude to the possibility 
that the monopoly of the state, in the use of force, can be challenged and that 
breaking away from legally accepted forms of contention is necessary. At this 
stage, military episodes, in most cases, are no longer decodable as manifesta-
tions of wider social conflicts, but as products of a military group seeking self-
promotion. Social dynamics, as points of reference for political action, slowly 
become redundant, while the armed organization pursues its own reproduc-
tion in terms of membership and infrastructures. Targets are no longer chosen 
on the basis of their significance in relation to social issues, but for their capac-
ity to illustrate the military power of the organization (Ruggiero 2006). Politi-
cal violence, in such cases, aims at strengthening resolve and group cohesion, 
at conveying an image of determination, potency and involving an element of 
spectacular propaganda, making it attractive to potential recruits and menac-
ing to the chosen enemies.
Armed struggle echoes the notion of the irregular fighter or partisan pos-
ited by carl Schmitt (2007). Like those involved in civil or colonial wars, parti-
sans do not abide by rules of battle, nor do they believe that regular forces are 
the only bearers of a ius belli. They expect neither justice nor mercy from their 
enemies, as they reject the notion of enmity prevailing in conventional wars. 
Another characteristic of partisans, beside irregularity, is “political commit-
ment which sets them apart from other fighters and from common thieves and 
criminals, whose motives aim at private enrichment” (ibid., 13). There is then 
the characteristic of mobility, namely the capacity to choose targets located 
outside and beyond a legally demarcated battle field. Finally, partisans possess 
a tellurian character, that is to say, the ability to find hospitality among groups 
and individuals embedded in networks of dissent and active in social conflict. 
Hence, as argued above, the necessity for those involved to share beliefs and 
goals with sections of social movements. 
As a rule, armed struggle involves violence against state actors, it implies 
the creed that some governments or states have no right to be obeyed by their 
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subjects. Such governments and states become the chosen targets of dissatis-
fied people who “deposit” and accumulate rage in social movements and armed 
organizations, as if these were banks, before releasing it (Sloterdijk 2016). The 
use of violence, here, is perfectly congruent with views that social change is 
usually brought violently within the inevitable course of history. 
TERRoRISM AnD WAR
“Attacks on soldiers are not terrorist attacks”: this is the opinion of Michael 
Walzer (2006, 3), in a way echoing the statement above that violence against 
state actors is more appropriately defined as armed struggle. Terrorism, in-
stead, consists in the deliberate killing of innocent people, of non-combatants 
at random. This definition brings us back to the different stages of the escalat-
ing process I have already delineated.
When the accumulation of military force, though significant, appears to 
be insufficient to match that possessed by the institutions, armed propaganda 
becomes unrealistic. Political activists and social groups in general cannot be 
offered competitive structures and practices leading to a different social order. 
Defeat is most likely and social and political gains are replaced with gains in 
other, less palpable spheres. The choice of targets can no longer be justified 
by the specific social goal pursued, but is given a transcendental justification 
that camus (1965) terms historical. According to camus, there are some po-
litical conflicts emphasizing history and others emphasizing humanity. The 
emphasis on history destroys all limits to human action, because history itself 
becomes the supreme judge of the morality of the action. Violent groups, in-
spired by a sense of historical inevitability, appropriate the “right to punish” 
from their enemy and, after dressing it with a religious mantle, put punish-
ment at the center of the universe. The sense of historical inevitability makes 
violence randomized, limitless: history will vindicate the legitimacy of that 
violence (Ruggiero 2006). 
contemporary wars and illegitimate invasions share several characteristics 
with terrorism: both contain elements of what is known as hate crime, namely 
the perception that victims are representatives of specific communities, and 
that they are not attacked in their capacity as individuals, but as individuals 
belonging to a real or imagined alien group. Hatred is also based on identi-
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ties, lifestyles, cultural values and tastes, and it constitutes a reservoir of bit-
ter memories that can trigger violent antagonism. contemporary wars and 
illegitimate invasions are variants of state-sponsored terrorism and counter-
terrorism. They share feud-like elements of vengeance with terrorism, answer-
ing random violence with random violence. The war on terror, in brief, puts 
terrorists in the inescapable position of waging a war when their fantasy was 
being acknowledged as real, that is, when they take on the bellicose features of 
those waging a real war on them. Terrorists are thus sanctified and martyrdom 
is encouraged.
contemporary wars, state terror and the war on terror resemble terrorism 
in a number of other respects. Like terrorism, they ignore international and 
national legislations and are waged randomly. They claim to be responding in 
self-defense to prior or potential attacks by enemies. State representatives and 
terrorist leaders may claim that the random violence they use is a last resort, 
and that they are defending themselves by counter-attacking. Both can define 
the other party as “more terrorist,” because both can claim that the other party 
has deprived them of every other means of interaction or negotiation; both can 
describe themselves as the victims of prior aggressions, rather than the aggres-
sors. Despite the similarities, however, there is an obvious asymmetry between 
terrorism and counter-terrorism that needs to be examined.
The clash between two states endowed with comparable military strength 
may observe agreed conventional rules which are beneficial to both. These 
rules may provide a rational backdrop to the contenders, who will find use-
ful the establishment of predicable uses of certain weapons and their impact, 
along with the precise ways in which prisoners of war will be treated. In asym-
metrical wars, on the contrary, unconventional means are likely to be used by 
both parties: by the stronger as a way of expressing its unchallengeable superi-
ority, and by the weaker as a way of redressing its manifest inferiority. Which-
ever party starts resorting to unconventional means, these will be used by the 
other in response, in an exchange whereby each claims to be drawn to such 
means by the enemy. In this respect, as all those involved end up resorting to 
similar illegal means, asymmetrical wars become totally criminal. By choosing 
asymmetrical wars, states accept to share the language of those they attempt 
to fight and extend “war against an organized enemy to war against a largely 
unarmed population” (Shaw 2001, 5).
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contemporary wars are, at the same time, becoming forms of paramilitary 
policing, non-clausewitzian conflicts that do not involve the exclusive use of 
regular armed forces and do not entail distinctive, bilaterally accepted states of 
belligerence. For this reason, they are more likely to take place outside agreed 
rules and are bound to destroy the very principles in the name of which they 
are waged (Hirst 2001). They signal the failure of democracies to allow poli-
tics, in the classical sense of the term, “free play.” They mark, simultaneously, 
a return to pre-political forms of conflict and the end of political possibility 
(Alexander 2004). The parties involved pursue a powerful religious legitima-
tion, which is righteous and holy, and is arbitrarily derived from their respec-
tive tradition. “Drawing from sacred narratives of judgment, each tradition 
has produced ethical prophecies that legitimate violent means for holy ends, 
prophecies that culminate in apocalyptic visions of the pathway to paradise” 
(ibid., 93).
Holy wars, wars declared in the name of a god, attempt to avenge a sac-
rilege by imposing a destructive ban upon sinners. Through this type of war, 
the victors prove the superiority of their creed, therefore of their divinity, and 
hence their right to impose political and economic authority on the unfaith-
ful. contemporary holy wars engage conflicting theological doctrines that are 
trying to subjugate one another, and while they appear to be so distant, such 
doctrines, in fact, are very similar in their will to impose total subjugation. In 
this sense, while seeming to be the result of failed communication, they prove 
to be the highest possible form of communication, in that those involved uti-
lize a similar religious vocabulary.
REDUcInG PoLITIcAL VIoLEncE
That identities are formed through violence, as stated at the beginning of 
this paper, does not imply the ineluctable necessity that interactions are to 
remain connoted by violence. on the contrary, the typology sketched above 
aims to provide a preliminary orientation in a process that might reduce rather 
than justify the use of violence. In this sense, it is possible to operate a crucial 
“breakage” between our original constitution as social beings and the behavior 
we adopt in our current context. As Butler (2009, 167) contends: “It mat be 
that precisely because one is formed through violence, the responsibility not to 
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repeat the violence of one’s formation is all the more pressing and important.” 
More attention is normally devoted to how terrorism springs, thrives and 
becomes durable, rather than how it declines and withers. As the end point 
of a funneling process, terrorism is said to find its inception in dispossess-
ing or depriving conditions, which brew dissatisfaction that then turns into 
an ideology. Motivations arise, followed by mobilization and propaganda, ac-
companied by financial means, weapons and technology as resources (Smelser 
2007). As for the decline of terrorism, a hypothetical process including the fol-
lowing stages has been identified. First, preemption through target hardening, 
imprisonment or killing of leaders. Second, deterrence in the form of harsher 
antiterrorist legislations. Third, burnout as one of the outcomes of harsher 
laws, which cause conflict among members and, ultimately, defections. Finally, 
backlash, resulting in the withering away of support or complicity the terrorist 
groups enjoy (Ross and Gurr 1989). 
From the perspective adopted here, political violence is instead a form of 
joint action, in that it cannot be broken down into the separate acts compos-
ing it: in brief, terrorism cannot be separated from anti-terrorism. The dif-
ferent types of violence listed and discussed in this paper affect each other 
and determine the respective evolutions, shapes and intensity. More systemic 
or structural violence makes people more vulnerable and, at the same time, 
opens up novel opportunities for growing institutional violence. When social, 
economic and political arrangements cause increasing harm, those victimized 
experience a decline in their ability to react: their vulnerability, in other words, 
follows a cumulative trajectory. By vulnerability, here, it should be understood 
as a mélange of lack of material resources, lack of communication tools and 
lack of political representation that would be necessary for collective demands 
to be put forward.
A deficit of political representation causes a reduction of the space for 
opposition, and this, in turn, determines an expansion of the space for insti-
tutional violence. This type of political violence, as suggested above, consists 
of violations perpetrated by individuals and groups against their own official 
principles and philosophies, and it belongs to the family of the crimes of the 
powerful. With the consequent widening of the illegality of the powerful, the 
space for dissent becomes yet more restricted, with the dangerous result that 
political opponents may be led to adopt illicit means of contention. In this 
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way, the illegality of institutional violence will be mimicked by the illegality of 
aggrieved groups. The form of political violence, identified as group violence, 
will spread in the guise of outbursts and riots. But, as outbursts and riots will 
inevitably prove unsuccessful in bringing social change, a circular mechanism 
may then be triggered, whereby repression will select activists and protesters, 
pushing the most resolute toward armed struggle and, ultimately, terrorism. 
This process, in turn, will find scarce reactive energies among the ordinary 
population, which is made impotent by the lack of political representation and 
led to apathy and disinterest. consensus and support for state agencies, as a 
consequence, may decline, leaving the field open to an increasing deployment 
of violence by state as well as non-state entities. Society will then act as a sheer 
spectator. 
State and non-state agents may be emboldened by their success, and there-
fore intensify their violence as a way of achieving increasing power. on the 
other hand, they may radicalize their action by a reversal of fortunes, for 
example, a temporary defeat. This, in effect, might act as a warning that yet 
more radical forms of action are required. In both cases, however, what is 
strengthened is not their capacity to mobilize individual and collective forces, 
or sympathy and support for their violence. It is their military capacity and 
the general volume of warfare that might increase, leading state and non-state 
agents to distance themselves even more from the majority of social actors, 
their needs and hopes. 
A general reduction of all types of political violence, therefore, could be 
produced, to start with by limiting systemic violence, refocusing on the vul-
nerability of ordinary citizens and attempting to minimize their deprivation 
and precariousness. The release of resources would make life possible for an 
increasing number of persons, which is not only an ethical requirement but 
also a civic obligation and, ultimately, a political necessity. Individuals and 
groups who flourish in a political sense constitute aggregations, express views 
that enrich the democratic process and formulate demands. Rather than limit-
ing their action to the periodical electoral choice, they engage in dialogue with 
other forces and indirectly exercise a form of control or vigilance over insti-
tutional decisions affecting all. These aggregations include independent me-
dia and professionals, pressure groups, non-governmental organizations and 
social movements. Traditionally, these have played an important role as vehi-
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cles for the expression of collective needs and sentiments, but also as umpires 
endowed with the critical faculty to articulate judgments. Social movements, 
for instance, express implicit judgments over issues and policies, creating 
boundaries between the goals and procedures that pursue the collective good 
and those that cause divisions and exclusion. Boundaries are also drawn on 
the ways in which demands are formulated and collective action is carried out. 
Most social movements may use force as a means of self-defense but would 
condemn the planning and organization of group violence, which would be 
likely to be assimilated to the military culture against which they fight. Social 
movements that mistrust leaderships and vanguards are reluctant to be repre-
sented by, or complicit with, armed minorities who purport to provide them 
with strategic guidance. Moreover, social movements may abstain from violent 
practices, so that the other types of political violence exercised by state actors, 
including war, can be more clearly exposed.
The decline of armed struggle and terrorism is simultaneous with the de-
cline of systemic and institutional violence, and ultimately with the growth of 
social movements opposing all forms of political violence. The last decades 
have shown that armed organizations begin to collapse when some of their 
members feel that movements active in the civil society are no longer pre-
pared to express their sympathy or complicity (Ruggiero 2010). They collapse 
when the political violence they express becomes too similar to the institu-
tional violence against which social movements fight. Activists and militants 
can hardly be regarded as revolutionaries if they resemble their enemy and do 
what the power they want to replace does. nor can one claim that the violence 
one expresses will eradicate violence from society, as this claim can too easily 
be enunciated by all factions, namely all representatives of the different types 
of political violence discussed here. 
Resources granted to citizens would make them able to act politically, and, 
as such, to set up peaceful protest and negotiation, establish dialogue and pur-
sue deliberative forms of democracy. These forms encourage the perception 
of public life as based on the interdependency of persons, but also entail the 
possibility of accessing the political realm and elaborating collective demands. 
Expanding the opportunity structure for groups devoid of representation can 
only be beneficial, as conduits for the expression of their grievances may de-
velop along with less lethal means of expressing them. 
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The growth of social movements is therefore paramount in the process that 
might bring a general decline in political violence. Some may dislike this con-
clusion, as social movements convey ideas of protest, dissent, contentious poli-
tics. on the other hand, what distinguishes democratic systems is their specific 
capacity to respond to dissent and to deal with contentious politics. 
Ultimately, democracy distinguishes itself from other regimes in that its 
elected political agents should be able to interact with challengers, with new 
political entities and their innovative collective action (Tilly 2004; 2007). De-
mocracies, in brief, can be classified on the basis of the elasticity of their struc-
tures and the degree to which they encourage political processes and social 
dynamism leading to change.
concLUSIon
Political violence is engrained in clashes around interests and values; it in-
corporates crime and punishment at the same time. Its intensity increases with 
the distance separating social groups and with fluctuations in the distribution 
of roles, resources and status: “nothing static causes conflict or crime” (Black 
2011, 160). This paper has presented a typology of the different forms of po-
litical violence, linking them in a continuum and in an interdependent field 
of forces. Systemic and institutional violence have been described as expres-
sions, respectively, of social, political and economic arrangements as well as of 
the illegality perpetrated by state agents. Group violence, manifested through 
crowd outbursts and riots, has been linked with rage and dissatisfaction, al-
though not with general political programs. With armed struggle, we have 
entered the domain of politically organized violence, a type of violence the 
efficacy and duration of which rests on strong relationships with large social 
movements. Finally, terrorism and war have been characterized as random po-
litical violence targeting non-combatants or entire populations. As a strategy 
for the reduction of all forms of political violence, the creation of a reformed 
political arena has been advocated, one in which social movements thrive, and 
interactions among individuals and groups are guided by the awareness on 
their interdependency (Balibar 2015). In the course of history, clashes have of-
ten been accompanied by collective emancipation, liberation and democrati-
zation, particularly when politics has abandoned cruelty and embraced civility. 
In the current troubled times, it would be worth doing likewise.
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Politinis smurtas: tipologija
VIncEnzo RUGGIERo
S a n t r a u k a
Šis straipsnis pateikia skirtingų politinio smurto formų tipologiją, susiedamas jas 
į tam tikrą kontinuumą ir tarpusavyje susijusių jėgų lauką. Įvardytosios formos yra 
sisteminis smurtas, institucinis smurtas, grupinis smurtas, ginkluota kova, terorizmas 
ir karas. Paskutinėje dalyje, pateikus diskusiją apie įtaką, kurią šios smurto rūšys daro 
viena kitai, pasiūloma strategija, kaip suderintai ir vienu metu jas mažinti.
